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Abstract
In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of ra-
tional choice under risk, namely expected comparative 
utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice op-
tion, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the 
choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) 
of a in G— that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a 
and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in 
G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any 
agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S should rank 
his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy 
they are) according to their comparative expected compar-
ative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option 
carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a's CECU 
is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever 
alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a's ECU is 
a probability- weighted sum of a's CUs across the various 
possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in 
some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers 
different verdicts from those of standard decision theory.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Standard decision theory, otherwise known as expected utility (EU) theory, counsels agents to rank 
their choice options (in order of preference) according to their EU and to choose whichever option 
carries the greatest EU. The EU of an option is a probability- weighted sum of each of its possible 
utilities. EU theory has been the dominant normative theory of rational choice under risk since the 
18th century (Bernoulli, 1738), and in more recent times (1920s– ), has received foundational support 
from both economists and philosophers (Bolker, 1966; Jeffrey, 1983; Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947).1
In this paper, I will argue for a new normative alternative to EU theory. I will argue that from the 
fact that we need a graded, quantitative measure of choiceworthiness for decisions under certainty and 
decisions under risk,2 it follows that we need a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, 
namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I will show that for any choice option, a, and for 
any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a, in G, is the difference in utility, in 
G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G. This difference in utility is 
what I will call the comparative utility (CU) of a. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, 
ECU theory counsels S to measure and rank his or her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) 
according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and to choose whichever option 
carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a, a's CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of 
whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a's ECU is a probability- weighted sum of 
a's CUs across the various possible states of the world. In this paper, I will show that in some ordinary 
decisions under risk, ECU theory gives different verdicts from those of EU theory and that EU theory 
therefore fails as a normative theory of rational choice under risk.
The idea of calculating differences between the utility of an option under consideration and the 
utilities of its alternatives in the choice situation— idea essentially similar to ECU theory— has been 
explored in the philosophical literature (Colyvan, 2008; Colyvan & Hájek, 2016)3 and economic mod-
eling literature (Zhang, 2015; Zhang et al., 2004).
2 |  THE ARGUMENT FOR ECU THEORY
This paper will argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely ECU theory. 
The argument can be broken down into 15 steps, which are numbered below.
Let us begin with a preliminary argument (i.e., the instrumental rationality argument). First, note 
that, in what follows, I will use the words choiceworthy and choiceworthiness in a non- moral sense. 
Therefore, what is choiceworthy for S should be distinguished from what it is morally good or mor-
ally right for S to do, and choiceworthiness should be distinguished from moral goodness and moral 
rightness.4
1. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty or any decision under risk and for 
any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a is worthy of being chosen by 
S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various possible states of the world, 
where S’s rational preferences are preferences that obey the series of rationality conditions 
or axioms of standard decision theory. Moreover, the degree to which a is choiceworthy for 
S, or (i.e.) the choiceworthiness of a for S, is the degree to which a is worthy of being 
chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various possible states 
of the world.
   | 3A RESTATEMENT OF EXPECTED COMPARATIVE UTILITY THEORY
2. S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational if and only if S’s choosing a is a suitable means to S’s 
ends (i.e., S’s rational preferences),5 and the degree to which S’s choosing a is instrumentally 
rational is the degree to which S’s choosing a is a suitable means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s rational 
preferences).
3. a is worthy of being chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various 
possible states of the world if and only if S’s choosing a is a suitable means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s 
rational preferences), and the degree to which a is worthy of being chosen by S in light of S’s ra-
tional preferences within each of the various possible states of the world is the degree to which S’s 
choosing a is a suitable means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s rational preferences).
4. Therefore, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational, and the 
choiceworthiness of a for S is the degree to which S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational. (4 fol-
lows from 1 to 3.)
In what follows, I will assume that for any agent, S, and for any choice option, a, for S, a's utility is 
a cardinal indicator of preference and is derived from S’s preferences as in standard decision theory, 
that is, via a representation theorem. This requires that S’s preferences obey a series of conditions or 
axioms of rational preference, one of which is the Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (for 
preferences): if an option, a, is preferred over some alternative option, b, then introducing a third op-
tion, c, in the choice situation will not change the preference ordering between a and b. For the present 
purposes, rational preference is analysed as satisfying the IIA. Note however that the IIA has been 
challenged (Sen, 1993; Wedgwood, 2013, pp. 2668– 2670).
The argument for ECU theory proceeds as follows:
1. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a is 
maximally choiceworthy for S over the space of all alternatives in the choice set.
2. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is maximally choiceworthy for S over the space of 
all alternatives in the choice set if and only if a maximizes choiceworthiness for S over the space 
of all alternatives in the choice set.
3. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a maximizes 
choiceworthiness for S over the space of all alternatives in the choice set (i.e., the choiceworthiness 
maximization (CM) principle). (3 follows from 1 and 2.)
4. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, the measure of the 
choiceworthiness of a for S is its CECU, that is, the difference between its ECU and that of which-
ever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several alternatives 
are tied) (i.e., the CECU principle). a's ECU is a probability- weighted sum of a's CUs across the 
various states of the world, where, for any state of the world, G, a's CU in G is the difference in 
utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G (or one of 
them in the event that several alternatives are tied).
5. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy 
for S if and only if a maximizes CECU. (5 follows from 3 and 4.)
6. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any number of alternative options, a, 
b, c, d, and e, for S, it is rational for S to prefer a to b if and only if a's EU is greater than b's, it is 
rational for S to be indifferent between a and b if and only if a's EU is equal to b's, and the extent 
to which it is rational for S to prefer a to b is the difference in EU between a and b.
7. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, it is rational for S 
to (weakly6) prefer a over the alternative options in the choice set if and only if a maximizes EU. 
(7 follows from 6.)
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8. In decisions under risk, what option(s) maximize CECU sometimes differ from what option(s) 
maximize EU.
9. In decisions under risk, what option(s) are choiceworthy sometimes differ from what option(s) it is 
rational to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the choice set. (9 follows from 5, 7 and 8.)
10. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental rationality 
that S should measure and rank his or her options in terms of how choiceworthy they are for S (i.e., 
how worthy of being chosen by S they are in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the 
various possible states of the world).
11. It is not the case that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of 
instrumental rationality that S should measure and rank his or her options in order of rational pref-
erence. (11 follows from 3, 9 and 10.)
12. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental rationality 
that S should measure and rank his or her options in terms of how choiceworthy they are for S, that 
is, according to their CECU, rather than in order of rational preference, that is, according to their 
EU. (12 follows from 4, 6, 8, 10 and 11.)
13. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental rationality 
that S should choose out of what option(s) are choiceworthy for S (i.e., what option(s) are worthy 
of being chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various possible states 
of the world).
14. It is not the case that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of 
instrumental rationality that S should choose out of what option(s) it is rational for S to (weakly) 
prefer over the alternative options in the choice set. (14 follows from 9 and 13.)
15. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk where what option(s) are choiceworthy for S 
differ from what option(s) it is rational for S to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the 
choice set, it is a requirement of instrumental rationality that S should choose out of what option(s) 
are choiceworthy for S (i.e., what option(s) maximize CECU), rather than out of what option(s) it 
is rational for S to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the choice set (i.e., what option(s) 
maximize EU). (15 follows from 5, 7, 9, 13 and 14, as well as from 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10.)
I will now discuss the different steps in the argument:
1. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a is 
maximally choiceworthy for S over the space of all alternatives in the choice set.
The question whether a given option is more (or less) choiceworthy than (or just as choiceworthy 
as) another option within a set of alternatives is well- formed and meaningful. Therefore, the question 
whether a given option is maximally choiceworthy within a set of alternatives is also well- formed and 
meaningful. I will assume that Step 1 is true without further argument.
2. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is maximally choiceworthy for S over the 
space of all alternatives in the choice set if and only if a maximizes choiceworthiness for S 
over the space of all alternatives in the choice set.
For any number of alternative choice options, a, b, c, d, and e, we want to say that a (utility: 100) 
is more choiceworthy than b (utility: 5) even if a is not choiceworthy tout court (i.e., a does not max-
imize utility). We also want to say that the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than b is greater 
than the extent to which c (utility: 10) is more choiceworthy than b. In order to say that a is more 
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choiceworthy than b (and to what extent), we cannot rely on a binary measure of choiceworthiness. 
Whether (and to what extent) a is more choiceworthy than b, and by implication, whether (and to 
what extent) any option is more choiceworthy than any other within a set of alternatives is necessar-
ily a function of how choiceworthy each of the two options is within the set of alternatives (and not 
necessarily a function of one being choiceworthy tout court and the other unchoiceworthy tout court). 
To ask how choiceworthy an option is to ask how desirable or worthy of being chosen that option is, 
how imperative it is to choose that option.7 Such a question is well- formed and meaningful. In order to 
answer the question, we require a graded, quantitative measure of how choiceworthy options are— i.e., 
we require a graded, quantitative measure of choiceworthiness.
3. For any agent, S, and for any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a 
maximizes choiceworthiness for S over the space of all alternatives in the choice set (i.e., 
the CM principle). (3 follows from 1 and 2.)
4. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, the measure of 
the choiceworthiness of a for S is its CECU, that is, the difference between its ECU and that of 
whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several alterna-
tives are tied) (i.e., the CECU principle). a's ECU is a probability- weighted sum of a's CUs across 
the various states of the world, where, for any state of the world, G, a's CU in G is the difference 
in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G (or one of 
them in the event that several alternatives are tied).
2.1 | The CU principle
In order to establish the CECU principle, I first need to argue for a graded, quantitative measure of 
choiceworthiness for decisions under certainty (i.e. the CU principle). According to the CU principle, 
for any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty and for any option, a, for S, the measure of 
the choiceworthiness of a for S is its comparative utility (CU). For any choice option, a, and for any 
state of the world, G, a's CU in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative 
to a carries the greatest utility in G (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied).8 In 
what follows, I will provide three arguments for the CU principle:
To that end, I will assume that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty and for 
any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a maximizes utility over the space of all al-
ternatives in the state of the world to which S assigns probability 1. I will refer to this principle as the 
utility maximization (UM) principle. The UM principle defines a binary measure of choiceworthiness 
for decisions under certainty (i.e., whether an option is choiceworthy tout court or unchoiceworthy 
tout court).
2.1.1 | Argument 1
It is generally accepted that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty and for any num-
ber of alternative options, a, b, c, d, and e, available to S, the extent to which a is more choiceworthy 
than b, for S, is the extent to which S (rationally) prefers a to b, or equivalently the extent to which S 
(rationally) prefers a to b more than S (rationally) prefers b to a. However, intuitively, that is a mis-
take. Even though we are comparing a to b, we want to see how a and b measure up to the very best 
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alternative options on offer, in the following way: the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than 
b, for S, is the extent to which S (rationally) prefers a to the most (rationally) preferred alternative to 
a (either b, c, d, or e) more than S (rationally) prefers b to the most (rationally) preferred alternative 
to b (either a, c, d, or e). After all, if S must choose an alternative to a, then S should choose the most 
(rationally) preferred alternative to a (either b, c, d, or e), and not necessarily the option to which S is 
comparing a (i.e., option b). The same goes for option b.
Therefore, the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than b, for S, is the extent to which {the 
difference in utility between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility} is greater 
than {the difference in utility between b and whichever alternative to b carries the greatest utility}. It 
follows that the extent to which a is choiceworthy for S (or [i.e.] the measure of how choiceworthy a 
is for S) is a's CU, i.e., the difference in utility between a and whichever alternative to a carries the 
greatest utility (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied) (i.e., the CU principle). 
The same goes for option b. (Henceforth, c- utiles are defined as units of CU.)
An alternative approach is to say that the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than b, for S, is 
the extent to which S (rationally) prefers a to the most (rationally) preferred option (either a, b, c, d, 
or e) more than S (rationally) prefers b to the most (rationally) preferred option (either a, b, c, d, or e). 
In other words, the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than b, for S, is the extent to which {the 
difference in utility between a and whichever option carries the greatest utility (either a, b, c, d, or 
e)} is greater than {the difference in utility between b and whichever option carries the greatest utility 
(either a, b, c, d, or e)}. If that is the case, then the extent to which a is choiceworthy for S (or [i.e.] the 
measure of how choiceworthy a is for S) is a's CU*, i.e., the difference in utility between a and which-
ever option carries the greatest utility (either a, b, c, d, or e) (or one of them in the event that several 
alternatives are tied) (henceforth, the CU* principle).9 The same goes for option b.
The CU* principle is however untenable since it results in a double standard. It entails that the 
degrees of choiceworthiness of all the option(s) that do not carry the greatest utility depend on what 
other options are available in the choice set— those degrees of choiceworthiness may be different neg-
ative numbers, but never 0— whereas the degrees of choiceworthiness of all the option(s) that do carry 
the greatest utility do not depend on what other options are available in the choice set— those degrees 
of choiceworthiness are 0 no matter what the utilities of the other options are. Moreover, the latter 
standard is implausible. It's as if the degrees of choiceworthiness of all the option(s) that do not carry 
the greatest utility did not depend on what other options are available in the choice set— it's as if those 
degrees of choiceworthiness were the same negative number, e.g., −1, no matter what the utilities of 
the other options are. Contrary to the CU* principle, the original CU principle does not suffer from 
these problems.
Let us now consider four choice situations involving decisions under certainty (see Table 1):
Compared to the difference in utility and difference in CU*, the difference in CU is a more plau-
sible measure of the extent to which a is more choiceworthy than b in situations 1– 4, as explained 
T A B L E  1  Decision matrix
1 2 3 4
a 5 5 5 5
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 2 2 2
d 1 3 3 3
e 1 3 5 8
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above. The differences in utility and CU* between a and b are the same in all four situations (4 units), 
whereas the differences in CU between a and b are as follows (in situations 1– 4):
1. (5 – 1) – (1 – 5) = 8 c- utiles
2. (5 – 3) – (1 – 5) = 6 c- utiles
3. (5 – 5) – (1 – 5) = 4 c- utiles
4. (5 – 8) – (1 – 8) = 4 c- utiles
The CU principle is therefore well- supported.
2.1.2 | Argument 2
1. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty and for any option, a, for S, 
a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a is worthy of being chosen by S over whichever 
alternative to a is the most choiceworthy for S. (True by definition)
2. a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a maximizes choiceworthiness for S over the space of all alter-
natives in the choice set (i.e., the CM principle). (Assumption)
3. The extent to which a is choiceworthy for S (or [i.e.] the measure of how choiceworthy a is for S) 
is the extent to which a is worthy of being chosen by S over whichever alternative to a is the most 
choiceworthy for S. (3 follows from 1 and 2.)
4. a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a maximizes utility over the space of all alternatives in the 
choice set (i.e., the UM principle). (Assumption)
5. a is the most choiceworthy option available to S in the choice set if and only if a carries the greatest 
utility in the choice set. (5 follows from 2 and 4.)
6. a is the most choiceworthy option available to S in a restricted choice set if and only if a carries the 
greatest utility in that restricted choice set. (6 follows from 5.)
7. Whichever alternative to a is the most choiceworthy for S is whichever alternative to a carries the 
greatest utility. (7 follows from 6.)
8. The extent to which a is worthy of being chosen by S over some alternative to a is the difference in 
utility between a and that alternative to a. (True by conceptual analysis)
9. Therefore, the extent to which a is choiceworthy for S (or [i.e.] the measure of how choiceworthy a 
is for S) is the difference in utility between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest util-
ity (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied) (i.e., the CU principle). (9 follows 
from 3, 7 and 8.)
2.1.3 | Argument 3
Let us now consider a much longer argument. The simplest attempt at defining a graded, quantitative 
choiceworthiness measure for decisions under certainty is as follows: for any agent, S, faced with any 
decision under certainty and for any option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S is 
the utility of a in the state of the world to which S assigns probability 1. I will refer to this as the utility 
principle. The UM principle is true if (but not only if) the utility principle is true. The utility principle 
is, however, untenable.
First, measures of quantities, for example 20℃ for temperature, are meaningful (and only mean-
ingful) relative to a given zero point and unit of measurement. (Let us call this the measurement 
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principle.) In the case of temperature, the measure (e.g., 20℃) is defined in relation to the zero point 
and unit of measurement (i.e., the measure itself presupposes a given temperature unit and zero point 
of temperature). That is not the case for utility. In accordance with the measurement principle, the 
measure of a's utility (e.g., 20 units of utility [or utiles]) is meaningful (and only meaningful) relative 
to a given utility unit and zero point of utility. However, the measure (e.g., 20 units of utility) is not 
defined in relation to the unit and zero point (i.e., the utility measure itself does not presuppose a given 
utility unit and zero point of utility).10 These values must be explicitly specified. Hence, the utility 
principle is at best underspecified.
Second, even relative to an explicitly given utility unit and zero point of utility, the measure of 
the choiceworthiness of a for S is not necessarily its utility. In accordance with the measurement 
principle, for any given decision situation (under certainty) and for any specified utility unit and 
zero point of utility (for that situation), the measure of the choiceworthiness of any available option 
is its utility value if and only if it is possible to ascertain how choiceworthy any available option is 
(in that situation) by solely considering its utility value in relation to that specified utility unit and 
zero point of utility. In practical terms, what this means is that, for any given decision setup (i.e., any 
decision situation combined with any explicit specification of a utility unit and zero point of utility), 
the measure of the choiceworthiness of any available option is its utility value if and only if (a) any 
available option is choiceworthy just in case its utility value is equal to or greater than zero (and not 
choiceworthy otherwise) and (b) the degree of choiceworthiness of any available option is its utility 
value. Now, it is straightforward to come up with decision situations where it is possible to select a 
specific zero point of utility (and a specific utility unit) such that it is not the case that any available 
option is choiceworthy (in that situation) if and only if its utility value is equal to or greater than zero. 
Per the UM principle, there are possible decision setups where an option has a positive utility value 
and is nevertheless unchoiceworthy, namely setups where that option does not maximize utility over 
the space of all available alternatives, and there are possible decision setups where an option has a neg-
ative utility value and is nevertheless choiceworthy, namely setups where that option does maximize 
utility over the space of all available alternatives. Therefore, per the measurement principle, there are 
possible decision setups such that it is not the case that the measure of the choiceworthiness of any 
available option (in that setup) is its utility value.
In light of the preceding considerations and in accordance with the measurement principle, it is 
necessarily the case that for any agent, S, faced with any decision situation under certainty and for any 
option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S depends on a unit of measurement of 
choiceworthiness as well as a zero point of choiceworthiness (or benchmark) in the following way: the 
measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any explicitly given utility unit and zero point of 
utility) is the difference in utility between a and some benchmark for a, such that (i) a is choiceworthy 
for S if and only if the difference in utility between a and the benchmark for a is equal to or greater than 
zero (and not choiceworthy otherwise), and (ii) the degree of choiceworthiness of a for S is the differ-
ence in utility between a and the benchmark for a. In other words, the measure of the choiceworthiness 
of a for S is the degree to which a is worthy of being chosen over the benchmark for a. The benchmark 
for a can be, for example, some option in the set of available options, such as whichever option has 
the highest utility, whichever option has the lowest utility, or the status quo, or some average of the 
utilities of the available options. Choiceworthiness is thus a relative concept.11 As will become clear 
in what follows, the concept of choiceworthiness itself presupposes a given benchmark (or zero point 
of choiceworthiness).
If there are any alternatives to a which carry a greater utility than does a, then the benchmark for a 
is whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility. Indeed, if there are any alternatives to a with 
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a greater utility than a, then, in accordance with the UM principle, a is not choiceworthy for S. But if 
a is not choiceworthy for S, then how choiceworthy a is for S is simply how a compares to whichever 
alternative is choiceworthy for S (or, per the UM principle, whichever alternative to a carries the great-
est utility). I will now argue that if there are not any alternatives to a which carry a greater utility than 
does a, then the benchmark for a still has to be whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility. 
As far as I know, this idea has not been explored by others in the published literature.
Let us consider two decision situations (or setups): 1 and 2. In each situation, S is faced with the 
same three options: a, b, and c. What's more, in each situation, S assigns probability 1 to a given state 
of the world (but not the same state for both situations). If that state of the world is realized, then S 
assigns the following utilities to the set of options (see Table 2):
Per the UM principle, a is choiceworthy for S in both situations 1 and 2. a is also more choicewor-
thy for S in 1 than in 2— that is to say, it is more imperative for S to choose a if S is in situation 1 than 
if S is in situation 2. In 2, S misses out on only 1 utile by not choosing a, but instead choosing the best 
alternative to a (i.e., b or c), whereas in 1, S misses out on 10,100 utiles by not choosing a, but instead 
choosing the best alternative to a (i.e., b or c). Another way of putting it is that a is more choiceworthy 
in 1 than in 2 because a is more worthy of being chosen over the best alternative to a in 1 than in 2.
Let us now briefly introduce Ralph Wedgwood's benchmark theory (BT) (Wedgwood, 2013). The 
basic idea of BT is to rank choice options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their 
expected comparative value, where the comparative value of an option is its value (broadly construed) 
in some state of the world compared to a benchmark for that state of the world. Wedgwood identifies 
the benchmark as an average of the options’ values within a given state of the world. He emphasizes 
that all statewise dominated options and more generally, “all the options that do not deserve to be 
taken seriously” (p. 2664) should be excluded from consideration at the outset.12 Wedgwood explicitly 
rejects the idea that the value of an option is its utility. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how BT 
(henceforth, BT*) fairs when the value of an option is understood to be its utility.
Coming back to our example, we can see that BT* agrees with the verdict that a is choiceworthy 
for S in situations 1 and 2, but not with the verdict that a is more choiceworthy for S in 1 than in 2. 
According to BT*, a is equally choiceworthy for S in situations 1 and 2 since b and c are strictly 
dominated by a in both 1 and 2 and are therefore excluded from consideration at the outset. If b and 
c are not excluded from consideration and the benchmark is identified as an average of the values (or 
utilities) of all the available options, then this alternative approach agrees with our verdict: a is more 
choiceworthy for S in 1 than in 2.
Here is a different example (see Table 3):
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Per the UM principle, a is choiceworthy for S in both situations 1 and 2. a is also more choice-
worthy for S in 1 than in 2— that is to say, it is more imperative for S to choose a if S is in situation 1 
than if S is in situation 2. In 2, a is merely optional— S misses out on zero utiles by not choosing a, 
but instead choosing the best alternative to a (i.e., c)— whereas in 1, a is not optional— S misses out 
on 200 utiles by not choosing a, but instead choosing the best alternative to a (i.e., b or c). Again, a is 
more choiceworthy in 1 than in 2 because a is more worthy of being chosen over the best alternative 
to a in 1 than in 2.
BT* agrees with both verdicts: a is choiceworthy for S in 1 and 2, and a is more choiceworthy for 
S in 1 than in 2. However, if the benchmark is defined as an average of the values (or utilities) of all 
the available options (whether strictly dominated or not), then this alternative approach does not agree 
with our verdict: a is more choiceworthy for S in 1 than in 2. The two examples just laid out, when 
taken together, make for an effective counterexample to BT*.
Another very similar example (see Table 4):
Per the UM principle, a is choiceworthy for S in both situations 1 and 2. a is also more choicewor-
thy for S in 1 than in 2— that is to say, it is more imperative for S to choose a if S is in situation 1 than 
if S is in situation 2. In 2, S misses out on only 1 utile by not choosing a, but instead choosing the best 
alternative to a (i.e., c), whereas in 1, S misses out on 200 utiles by not choosing a, but instead choos-
ing the best alternative to a (i.e., b or c). Once again, a is more choiceworthy in 1 than in 2 because a 
is more worthy of being chosen over the best alternative to a in 1 than in 2.
BT* agrees with the verdict that a is choiceworthy for S in 1 and 2, but not with the verdict that 
a is more choiceworthy for S in 1 than in 2. According to BT*, a is equally choiceworthy for S in 
situations 1 and 2 since b and c are strictly dominated by a in both 1 and 2 and are therefore excluded 
from consideration at the outset. If b and c are not excluded from consideration and the benchmark is 
identified as an average of the values (or utilities) of all the options, then a is more choiceworthy for 
S in 2 than in 1. I take this to be a further counterexample to BT*.
One final example (see Table 5):
Per the UM principle, a is choiceworthy for S in both situations 1 and 2. a is also equally choice-
worthy for S in both situations— that is to say, it is just as imperative for S to choose a if S is in situation 
1 as it is if S is in situation 2. In both situations, a is merely optional— S misses out on zero utiles by 
not choosing a, but instead choosing the best alternative to a (i.e., c). To put it another way, a is just as 
choiceworthy in 1 as it is in 2 because a is just as worthy of being chosen over the best alternative to 
a in 1 as it is in 2. (BT* agrees with both verdicts.)
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These four examples serve to illustrate that if there are not any alternatives to a with a greater utility 
than a, then how choiceworthy a is depends on how much utility S would miss out on by not choosing 
a, but instead choosing the best alternative to a. The greater the amount of utility S would miss out on 
by not choosing a, but instead choosing the best alternative to a, the more choiceworthy a becomes. 
Thus, the benchmark for a must be whichever alternative to a carries the highest utility.
What follows is that whether or not there are any alternatives to a which carry a greater utility than 
does a, the benchmark for a has to be whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility. This means 
that there is no unique benchmark for a given choice situation. Instead, the benchmark is relative to a spe-
cific choice option. The benchmark for a may be some alternative, b, and the benchmark for b may be a.
Therefore, for any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty and for any option, a, for S, the 
measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any explicitly given utility unit and zero point 
of utility) is the CU of a (in the state of the world to which S assigns probability 1). The CU of a is the 
difference in utility between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility (or one of them 
in the event that several alternatives are tied). As previously indicated, I will refer to this principle as 
the CU principle. Like the utility principle, the CU principle entails the UM principle.
In light of the CU principle, the utility principle can be falsified. If the utility principle were true, then 
in accordance with the measurement principle, it would be the case that for any given decision situation, 
there is at least one specification of a utility unit and zero point of utility such that it is possible to ascer-
tain how choiceworthy any available option is (for S) by solely considering its utility value in relation to 
that specification of a utility unit and zero point of utility. In other words, it would be the case that for any 
given decision situation, there is at least one specification of a utility unit and zero point of utility such 
that (a) any available option is choiceworthy (for S) if and only if its utility value is equal to or greater than 
zero (and not choiceworthy otherwise) and (b) the degree of choiceworthiness of any available option 
(for S) is its utility value. As we will now see, that is not the case. Let us consider the following decision 
setup: S is faced with three options: a, b, and c. What's more, S assigns probability 1 to a given state of 
the world. If that state of the world is realized, then S assigns the following utilities to the available op-
tions: a (0), b (−100), c (−1000). Therefore, no matter what zero point of utility is selected, S assigns the 
following utility intervals between the available options: between a and b, S assigns a positive interval 
of 100 utiles, between b and c, S assigns a positive interval of 900 utiles and between a and c, S assigns 
a positive interval of 1000 utiles. Per the CU principle, the degrees of choiceworthiness of the available 
options are as follows: a (100), b (−100), c (−1000). Therefore, the differences between the degrees of 
choiceworthiness of the available options are as follows: between a and b, the difference is 200 c- utiles, 
between b and c, the difference is 900 c- utiles and between a and c, the difference is 1100 c- utiles. Since 
the utility intervals and the differences in degrees of choiceworthiness are at variance, we have a decision 
situation where no matter what zero point of utility (and what utility unit) is selected, it is not the case that 
the degree of choiceworthiness of any available option is its utility value.
The utility principle, let us recall, states that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under cer-
tainty and for any option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S is the utility of a in 
the state of the world to which S assigns probability 1. Since the utility principle is false and since the 
expected utility of a equals the utility of a in the state of the world to which S assigns probability 1, it 
follows that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty or any decision under risk and for 
any option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S cannot be the expected utility of a.
2.2 | The CECU principle
As I argued in discussing Step 2, we require a graded, quantitative measure of how choiceworthy op-
tions are. When we move from decision- making under certainty to decision- making under risk, we 
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can, in light of the CU principle, identify the measure of an option's choiceworthiness as expressing 
that option's expected choiceworthiness, or ECU, that is to say, the expected value, or the probability- 
weighted sum of all possible values, of that option's choiceworthiness, or CU, in the actual state of the 
world. That roughly encapsulates ECU theory.
As a first approximation, then, ECU theory says that for any agent, S, and for any choice option, a, 
for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any explicitly given utility unit and 
zero point of utility) is the ECU of a. The ECU of an option, a, in a decision problem with n states is 
formally defined as:
where U(a, si) denotes the utility of option a when state si is actual, U(bm(a), si) denotes the utility of 
the benchmark for a when state si is actual (i.e., the utility in state si of whichever alternative(s) to a have 
the highest utility in state si), and P(si) denotes the probability assigned to state si. In other words, for any 
number of alternative options, a, b, c, d, and e, one calculates the ECU of a as follows: for each state of 
the world, one subtracts a's utility from the utility of b, c, d, or e, whichever of b, c, d, and e maximizes 
utility in that state, and one multiplies the result by the probability that one assigns to that state; finally, 
one sums the totals for every state.
The CU principle is straightforwardly entailed by ECU theory. Furthermore, ECU theory presup-
poses that the states of the world in any decision problem are probabilistically independent of the 
agent's choices.
ECU theory, as formulated above, is not quite right though. In accordance with the measurement 
principle, if the measure of the choiceworthiness of options is their ECU, then only options with ECU 
equal to or greater than zero can be choiceworthy. However, as I will illustrate in my discussion of 
Step 8, there will always be cases (regardless of what utility unit and zero point of utility are specified) 
where every option in a decision situation under risk has negative ECU. Since at least one option in a 
decision situation must be choiceworthy— the one with the highest degree of choiceworthiness (or one 
of them in the event that several alternatives are tied) (i.e., the CM principle)— ECU theory, as defined 
above, is false in decision cases under risk.
By the same lines of reasoning as employed in my discussion of Step 4 (Section 2.1.3), we reach 
the following conclusion: for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any choice 
option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any explicitly given utility 
unit and zero point of utility) is the comparative expected choiceworthiness, or comparative expected 
comparative utility (CECU), of a, that is to say, the difference in ECU between a and whichever alter-
native to a carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied). Let 
us call this principle the CECU principle. For any two alternative options, a and b, a's CECU is greater 
than b's if and only if a's ECU is greater than b's, and a's CECU is equal to b's if and only if a's ECU is 
equal to b's. We are now in a position to precisely define ECU theory: ECU theory is the conjunction 
of the CU principle (for decisions under certainty) and the CECU principle (for decisions under risk).
To demonstrate how to apply this new decision rule (i.e., ECU theory) to a concrete decision prob-
lem, let us consider the following case: An agent, S, is faced with a choice between two independent 
options or gambles: one option, a, offering a 0.01 probability of winning a prize worth 1500 utiles 
(and nothing otherwise), and one option, b, offering a 0.02 probability of winning a prize worth 700 
utiles (and nothing otherwise). According to ECU theory, S should choose option a, since its CECU is 







) − U(bm (a) , si))P(si)
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The ECUs of options a and b are given by the two equations below. The following notation is used: 
A denotes the state “If S chooses a, then S will not win the prize (0 utiles) and if S chooses b, then S 
will not win the prize (0 utiles)” (probability: 0.99 × 0.98 = 0.9702), B denotes the state “If S chooses 
a, then S will not win the prize (0 utiles) and if S chooses b, then S will win the prize (700 utiles)” 
(probability: 0.99 × 0.02 = 0.0198), C denotes the state “If S chooses a, then S will win the prize (1500 
utiles) and if S chooses b, then S will not win the prize (0 utiles)” (probability: 0.01 × 0.98 = 0.0098), 
D denotes the state “If S chooses a, then S will win the prize (1500 utiles) and if S chooses b, then S 
will win the prize (700 utiles)” (probability: 0.01 × 0.02 = 0.0002), P(A) denotes the probability of 
state A, and U(a, A) denotes the utility of option a when state A is actual. (See Table 6).
ECU(a) = (U(a, A) – U(b, A)) × P(A) + (U(a, B) – U(b, B)) × P(B) + (U(a, C)  
– U(b, C)) × P(C) + (U(a, D) – U(b, D)) × P(D) = 1 c- utile
ECU(b) = (U(b, A) – U(a, A)) × P(A) + (U(b, B) – U(a, B)) × P(B) + (U(b, C)  
– U(a, C)) × P(C) + (U(b, D) – U(a, D)) × P(D) = −1 c- utiles
One line of argument in support of ECU theory is that, contrary to EU theory, ECU theory agrees 
with and entails Wedgwood's Gandalf's principle: the choiceworthiness of an option in a given state 
of the world should be measured only relative to the values of the other options in that state, and not 
to the values of the options in other states. According to Wedgwood (2013, p. 2654),
to make a rational choice in [cases involving risk], one does not need to consider whether 
one is in a nice state of nature or a nasty one. All that one needs to consider are the 
degrees to which each of the available options is better (or worse) than the available al-
ternatives within each of the relevant states of nature. Admittedly, when one is uncertain 
which state of nature one is in, one must make some comparisons across the states of 
nature. But since one does not even need to know whether one is in a nice state of nature 
or a nasty one, it seems that the only relevant comparisons are comparisons of the differ-
ences in levels of goodness between the various options within each state of nature with 
the differences between those options within each of the other states of nature— not any 
comparisons of absolute levels of goodness across different states of nature.
Although Wedgwood uses terms such as “better,” “worse,” and “levels of goodness” in his explication 
of Gandalf's principle, the principle can be expressed equally well using replacement terms such as “pre-
ferred,” “dispreferred,” and “levels of utility.”
Gandalf's principle is an eminently reasonable principle.13 In a paper critiquing Wedgwood's BT, 
Robert Bassett (2015) concurs: “Gandalf's principle strikes me as an eminently sensible principle to 
incorporate into rational decision- making.” There is, however, one alternative decision theory which 
agrees with and entails both the CU principle and Gandalf's principle and which has some prima facie 
plausibility— maximum likelihood comparative utility (MLCU) theory: for any agent, S, and for any 
option, a, for S, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any explicitly given utility 
T A B L E  6  Decision matrix
A (0.9702) B (0.0198) C (0.0098) D (0.0002)
a 0 0 1500 1500
b 0 700 0 700
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unit and zero point of utility) is the most likely value of a's choiceworthiness (or CU) in the actual state 
of the world, and in cases where there is more than one maximally likely value of a's choiceworthiness 
(or CU) in the actual state of the word, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a for S (relative to any 
explicitly given utility unit and zero point of utility) is a's CECU across the maximally likely states of 
the world. We require a further argument to rule out MLCU theory.
This brings me to the following decision case: Let us suppose that an agent, S, is faced with three 
choice options: a, b, and c. S assigns probability 0.51 to a state of the world, A, and 0.49 to a state of 
the world, B. If state A or state B is realized, then S assigns the following utilities to the set of options 
(see Table 7):
According to MLCU theory, a is uniquely choiceworthy for S, since state A is more likely to obtain 
than state B and the CU of option a in state A is greater than that of any other available option. Yet, it 
is clear that choosing option a is a mistake, since state B is almost as likely to obtain as state A and the 
comparative disutility of option a in state B is very high (−1110 c- utiles). I take this to be an effective 
counterexample to MLCU theory.
5. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, a is 
choiceworthy for S if and only if a maximizes CECU. (5 follows from 3 and 4.)
6. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any number of alternative options, a, 
b, c, d, and e, for S, it is rational for S to prefer a to b if and only if a's EU is greater than b's, it is 
rational for S to be indifferent between a and b if and only if a's EU is equal to b's, and the extent 
to which it is rational for S to prefer a to b is the difference in EU between a and b.
Decision- theoretic representation theorems— such as those of Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947), Savage (1954), and Bolker (1966) and Jeffrey (1983)— show that if an agent fails to prefer 
choice options with higher EU, then that agent violates at least one of a series of axioms of rational 
preference,14 one of which is the IIA.
7. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk and for any option, a, for S, it is 
rational for S to (weakly) prefer a over the alternative options in the choice set if and only 
if a maximizes EU. (7 follows from 6.)
8. In decisions under risk, what option(s) maximize CECU sometimes differ from what option(s) 
maximize EU.
Let a finite decision be a decision problem where there are only finitely many states and no infinite 
utilities. In all finite decisions under risk requiring a choice between only two alternative options, ECU 
theory delivers the same verdicts as EU theory. However, in some finite decisions under risk requiring 
a choice between more than two alternative options, ECU theory gives different verdicts from those 
of EU theory.15 Let us consider the following example: an agent, S, is faced with five choice options: 
a, b, c, d, and e. S assigns probability 0.5 to a state of the world, A, and 0.5 to a state of the world, B. 
If state A or state B is realized, then S assigns the following utilities to the set of options (see Table 8):
T A B L E  7  Decision matrix
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According to EU theory, b is more choiceworthy than a, for S, since the EU of b (6.5 utiles) is 
greater than that of a (6 utiles). In fact, according to EU theory, b is choiceworthy tout court since its 
EU is greater than that of every other option.
EU(a) = (U(a, A) × P(A)) + (U(a, B) × P(B)) = 6 utiles
EU(b) = (U(b, A) × P(A)) + (U(b, B) × P(B)) = 6.5 utiles
EU(c) = (U(c, A) × P(A)) + (U(c, B) × P(B)) = 6 utiles
EU(d) = (U(d, A) × P(A)) + (U(d, B) × P(B)) = 6 utiles
EU(e) = (U(e, A) × P(A)) + (U(e, B) × P(B)) = 6 utiles
By contrast, according to ECU theory, a is more choiceworthy than b, for S, since the ECU of a (−3 
c- utiles) is greater than that of b (−3.5 c- utiles). In fact, according to ECU theory, a is choiceworthy 
tout court, since its CECU is equal to or greater than zero ([−3] – [−3] = 0).
ECU(a) = ((U(a, A) − U(e, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(a, B) − U(b, B)) × P(B)) = −3 c- utiles
ECU(b) = ((U(b, A) − U(e, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(b, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −3.5 c- utiles
ECU(c) = ((U(c, A) − U(e, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(c, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −4 c- utiles
ECU(d) = ((U(d, A) − U(e, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(d, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −4 c- utiles
ECU(e) = ((U(e, A) − U(d, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(e, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −3 c- utiles
ECU theory gives different verdicts from those of EU theory because ECU theory, contrary to 
EU theory, violates the IIA (for choiceworthiness evaluations). According to this principle, for any 
decision situation, T, and for any choice option, a, in T, if a is choiceworthy in T, then a is also choice-
worthy in T if some other option(s) are eliminated from the pool of options in T. Likewise, if a is not 
choiceworthy in T, then a is also not choiceworthy in T if some other option(s) are added to the pool 
of options in T. Let us consider again the previous decision situation. In that situation, ECU theory 
dictates that a is choiceworthy. However, if options c, d, and e are eliminated from the pool of options, 
then b is choiceworthy according to ECU theory, as shown below (see Table 9):
b is choiceworthy tout court since its CECU is equal to or greater than zero ([0.5] – [−0.5] = 1).
T A B L E  8  Decision matrix
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ECU(a) = ((U(a, A) − U(b, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(a, B) − U(b, B)) × P(B)) = −0.5 c- utiles
ECU(b) = ((U(b, A) − U(a, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(b, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = 0.5 c- utiles
Here is another example where ECU theory violates the IIA16: An agent, S, is faced with two 
choice options: a and b. S assigns probability 0.001 to a state of the world, A, and 0.999 to a state of 
the world, B. If state A or state B is realized, then S assigns the following utilities to the set of options 
(see Table 10):
According to ECU theory, a is choiceworthy tout court, since its CECU is equal to or greater than 
zero ([0.001] – [−0.001] = 0.002).
ECU(a) = ((U(a, A) − U(b, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(a, B) − U(b, B)) × P(B)) = 0.001 c- utiles
ECU(b) = ((U(b, A) − U(a, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(b, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −0.001 c- utiles
Let us now introduce a third choice option (c) in the decision situation, all else being the same (see 
Table 11):
In this new decision situation, b is choiceworthy tout court according to ECU theory, since b's 
CECU is equal to or greater than zero ([−0.001] – [−0.899] = 0.898).
ECU(a) = ((U(a, A) − U(c, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(a, B) − U(b, B)) × P(B)) = −0.899 c- utiles
ECU(b) = ((U(b, A) − U(a, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(b, B) − U(a, B)) × P(B)) = −0.001 c- utiles
ECU(c) = ((U(c, A) − U(a, A)) × P(A)) + ((U(c, B) − U(b, B)) × P(B)) = −2.098 c- utiles
This example is particularly telling because option c is statewise dominated by a. Whether state A 
or state B is actual, option a is strictly preferred to option c. Yet, introducing option c in the decision 
situation changes ECU theory's verdict: b, instead of a, is uniquely choiceworthy. ECU theory thus 
violates the Irrelevance of statewise dominated alternatives (ISDA) (Quiggin, 1994).
This gives rise to a worry. Without the IIA (and ISDA), it is possible to make up alternatives in any 
choice set and these manufactured alternatives would be altering the degrees of choiceworthiness of 
reasonable options.17 This opens the door to strategic manipulation in the decision process. The worry 
T A B L E  9  Decision matrix
A (0.5) B (0.5)
a 2 10
b 5 8
T A B L E  1 0  Decision matrix
A (0.001) B (0.999)
a 1000 1
b 0 2
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can be overcome, however, if we accept Nicholas Smith's theory of rationally negligible probabilities: 
for any given decision, any outcome with probability ≤p, where p is very close to 0, can be rationally 
excluded from consideration in the decision process (Chalmers, 2017; Monton, 2019; Smith, 2014, 
2016). As such, the very improbable outcomes of manufactured alternatives cannot alter the degrees 
of choiceworthiness of the other available options in the choice set.
Just as ECU theory delivers verdicts which are at odds with EU theory, ECU theory also supplies 
a more discriminating measure of the intervals in rankings of more than two choice options. Let us 
consider four choice situations involving decisions under certainty (see Table 12):
The difference in CU between a and b is greater in situation 1 ((5 – 1) – (1 – 5) = 8 c- utiles) than 
in situation 2 ((5 – 3) – (1 – 5) = 6 c- utiles), and is greater in situation 2 than in situation 3 ((5 – 5) –  
(1 – 5) = 4 c- utiles) and situation 4 ((5 – 8) – (1 – 8) = 4 c- utiles), whereas the difference in utility be-
tween a and b is the same in all four situations (4 utiles). Therefore, compared to utility, CU is a more 
discriminating measure of the intervals between a and b in situations 1 to 4. What's more, there are not 
any contrary cases where CU (or CECU) gives a less differentiated picture than does utility (or EU).
9. In decisions under risk, what option(s) are choiceworthy sometimes differ from what option(s) 
it is rational to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the choice set. (9 follows 
from 5, 7 and 8.)
What the foregoing comparisons between EU theory and ECU theory show is that rational prefer-
ence is not a reliable indicator of choiceworthiness. That is because whereas the criterion of rational 
preference (i.e., EU) satisfies the IIA (as assumed in this paper), the criterion of choiceworthiness (i.e., 
CECU) violates that principle (as demonstrated above). It is important to emphasize that the proposed 
criterion of choice (i.e., choiceworthiness) is independent from the standard choice criterion (i.e., ra-
tional preference). The latter is not shown here to violate the assumptions, for example, the IIA, which 
are needed to derive utilities from preferences via a representation theorem.
10.  For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental 
rationality that S should measure and rank his or her options in terms of how choiceworthy 
T A B L E  1 1  Decision matrix




T A B L E  1 2  Decision matrixa
1 2 3 4
a 5 5 5 5
b 1 1 1 1
c 1 2 2 2
d 1 3 3 3
e 1 3 5 8
a Table 12 is identical to Table 1.
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they are for S (i.e., how worthy of being chosen by S they are in light of S’s rational 
preferences within each of the various possible states of the world).
Whether (and to what extent) any option is more choiceworthy than any other within a set of al-
ternatives is necessarily a function of how choiceworthy each of the two options is within the set of 
alternatives. (See the discussion of Step 2.)
Let us now consider again the instrumental rationality argument:
1. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty or any decision under risk and 
for any option, a, for S, the degree to which a is choiceworthy for S, or (i.e.) the choice-
worthiness of a for S, is the degree to which a is worthy of being chosen by S in light of 
S’s rational preferences within each of the various possible states of the world, where S’s 
rational preferences are preferences that obey the series of rationality conditions or axioms 
of standard decision theory.
2. The degree to which S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational is the degree to which S’s choosing 
a is a suitable means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s rational preferences).
3. The degree to which a is worthy of being chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within 
each of the various possible states of the world is the degree to which S’s choosing a is a suitable 
means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s rational preferences).
4. Therefore, the choiceworthiness of a for S is the degree to which S’s choosing a is instrumentally 
rational. (4 follows from 1 to 3.)
11.  It is not the case that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a require-
ment of instrumental rationality that S should measure and rank his or her options in order 
of rational preference. (11 follows from 3, 9 and 10.)
12.  For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental 
rationality that S should measure and rank his or her options in terms of how choiceworthy 
they are for S, that is, according to their CECU, rather than in order of rational preference, 
that is, according to their EU. (12 follows from 4, 6, 8, 10 and 11.)
I can offer two further arguments for Step 12. First, contrary to the criterion of rational preference 
(i.e., EU), the criterion of choiceworthiness (i.e., CU/CECU) agrees with and entails Gandalf's principle, 
“an eminently sensible principle to incorporate into rational decision- making” (Bassett, 2015). Second, 
compared to the criterion of rational preference (i.e., EU), the criterion of choiceworthiness (i.e., CU/
CECU) supplies a more plausible measure of the intervals in rankings of more than two choice options. 
For decisions under certainty, see Section 2.1.1. For decisions under risk, consider the following decision 
matrices (Tables 13– 16).
For the same reasons as those given in Section 2.1.1 (except that we consider here rational prefer-
ences within various possible states of the world in lieu of rational preferences within decision situa-
tions under certainty), compared to the difference in EU, the difference in CECU is a more plausible 
measure of the extent to which option a is more choiceworthy than option b in decision matrices 
13– 16. The differences in EU between a and b are the same in all four decision matrices (4 units), 
whereas the differences in CECU between a and b are as follows:
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13.  For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of instrumental 
rationality that S should choose out of what option(s) are choiceworthy for S (i.e., what 
option(s) are worthy of being chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within each 
of the various possible states of the world).
T A B L E  1 3  Decision matrix
A (0.5) B (0.5) EU CECU
a 5 5 5 8
b 1 1 1 −8
c 1 1 1 −8
d 1 1 1 −8
e 1 1 1 −8
Note: The difference in CECU between a and b = 16 units.
T A B L E  1 4  Decision matrix
A (0.5) B (0.5) EU CECU
a 5 5 5 4
b 1 1 1 −6
c 2 2 2 −5
d 3 3 3 −4
e 3 3 3 −4
Note: The difference in CECU between a and b = 10 units.
T A B L E  1 5  Decision matrix
A (0.5) B (0.5) EU CECU
a 5 5 5 0
b 1 1 1 −4
c 2 2 2 −3
d 3 3 3 −2
e 5 5 5 0
Note: The difference in CECU between a and b = 4 units.
T A B L E  1 6  Decision matrix
A (0.5) B (0.5) EU CECU
a 5 5 5 −6
b 1 1 1 −10
c 2 2 2 −9
d 3 3 3 −8
e 8 8 8 6
Note: The difference in CECU between a and b = 4 units.
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Let us consider again the instrumental rationality argument:
1. For any agent, S, faced with any decision under certainty or any decision under risk and for 
any option, a, for S, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if a is worthy of being chosen by 
S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various possible states of the world, 
where S’s rational preferences are preferences that obey the series of rationality conditions 
or axioms of standard decision theory.
2. S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational if and only if S’s choosing a is a suitable means to S’s 
ends (i.e., S’s rational preferences).
3. a is worthy of being chosen by S in light of S’s rational preferences within each of the various 
possible states of the world if and only if S’s choosing a is a suitable means to S’s ends (i.e., S’s 
rational preferences).
4. Therefore, a is choiceworthy for S if and only if S’s choosing a is instrumentally rational. (4 fol-
lows from 1 to 3.)
14.  It is not the case that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, it is a requirement of 
instrumental rationality that S should choose out of what option(s) it is rational for S to (weakly) 
prefer over the alternative options in the choice set. (14 follows from 9 and 13.)
15.  For any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk where what option(s) are choiceworthy for S 
differ from what option(s) it is rational for S to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the 
choice set, it is a requirement of instrumental rationality that S should choose out of what option(s) 
are choiceworthy for S (i.e., what option(s) maximize CECU), rather than out of what option(s) it 
is rational for S to (weakly) prefer over the alternative options in the choice set (i.e., what option(s) 
maximize EU). (15 follows from 5, 7, 9, 13 and 14, as well as from 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10.)
3 |  CONCLUSION
In recent years, several alternatives to EU theory have been proposed, for example Mark Colyvan’s 
(2008) relative expectation theory (RET), Paul Bartha’s (2007, 2016) relative utility theory (RUT), 
and Lara Buchak’s (2013) risk- weighted expected utility (REU) theory. In all finite decision cases, 
RET and RUT deliver the same rankings and recommendations as EU theory. As for REU theory, it 
can deliver the same rankings and recommendations as EU theory, depending on the risk attitude of 
the agent equipped with the REU decision rule. These alternative “rational preference” tracking deci-
sion theories are therefore subject to the same objection as that leveled here against EU theory: they 
fall short as theories of instrumental rationality.
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ENDNOTES
 1  According to Martin Peterson, today, nearly all decision theorists agree that the “principle of maximizing ex-
pected value is the appropriate decision rule to apply to decisions under risk […] There are no serious contenders” 
(Peterson, 2017, p. 66).
 2  A decision under certainty is a choice situation where an agent is subjectively certain about which state the world 
is in and where he or she assigns probability 1 to that state being actual, whereas a decision under risk is a choice 
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situation where an agent is not subjectively certain about which state the world is in, but where he or she can never-
theless assign probabilities to the different possible states.
 3  Colyvan (2008) has argued for a new decision theory that gives the right verdicts in decision problems where there 
are an infinite number of states with only finite utilities attached, such as the St- Petersburg game, and where EU 
theory gives no verdicts whatsoever. Colyvan's new theory, i.e., relative expectation theory, states that rational agents 
rank their choice options on the basis of their relative expected utility: for any agent, S, and for any two options, a 
and b, S prefers a to b if and only if the probability- weighted sum of the differences in utility between a and b for 
each possible state is positive, and S is indifferent between a and b if and only if the probability- weighted sum of 
the differences in utility between a and b for each possible state is zero. Relative expectation theory gives the same 
decision advice as EU theory in all decision cases where there are only a finite number of possible states and where 
the states are probabilistically independent of all choice options. See also Colyvan and Hájek (2016).
 4  Moral rightness arguably cannot be measured on a graded scale (Hurka, n.d., 2019; Olsen, 2018; Sinhababu, 2018).
 5  According to Kolodny and Brunero (2020), “Someone displays instrumental rationality insofar as she adopts suitable 
means to her ends.”
 6  For any agent, S, and for any two choice options, a and b, for S, if S weakly prefers a to b, then S either prefers a to b 
or is indifferent between a and b.
 7  A qualification is in order: Let a and b denote two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive choice options. a is more 
choiceworthy than b if and only if choosing a is more imperative than choosing b, and a is just as choiceworthy as b if 
and only if choosing a is just as imperative as choosing b. However, if a is just as choiceworthy as b, then both a and 
b are choiceworthy, whereas if choosing a is just as imperative as choosing b, then neither choosing a nor choosing 
b is imperative.
 8  CU should be distinguished from the purely descriptive economic concept of opportunity cost. For any agent, S, let 
a be the highest- valued choice option available to S. The CU of a, for S, is the value of whatever additional benefit 
S would enjoy by choosing a over the highest- valued alternative to a. By contrast, the opportunity cost of a, for S, is 
the value of whatever cost S would incur by choosing a over the highest- valued alternative to a, where this includes 
the total value of the highest- valued alternative to a (Henderson, 2008).
 9 For any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, a's CU* in G is the difference in utility, in G, between a 
and whichever option carries the greatest utility in G (either a, b, c, d, or e) (or one of them in the event that several 
alternatives are tied). The rule of maximizing expected CU* (or ECU*) counsels agents to choose whichever option 
in the choice set has the greatest ECU*— i.e., a probability- weighted sum of an option's CUs* across the various 
states of the world. The rule of maximizing ECU* is equivalent to the rule of maximizing EU (i.e., EU theory), which 
means that both rules deliver the same verdicts in all decision cases.
 10  “[S]ince the utilities of options, whether ordinal or interval- valued, can only be determined relative to the utilities 
of other options, there is no such thing as the absolute utility of an option, at least not without further assumptions. 
The further assumptions would need to relate particular options to particular privileged levels of utility; for instance, 
one would need to argue that a rational agent's preference ordering should incorporate, say, a privileged zero- utility 
option, in which case ratios of utility distances from this option would be meaningful.” (Steele & Stefánsson, 2020) 
“The zero point and the unit in an expected utility representation are arbitrary; utility values become meaningful only 
once they have been fixed.” (Colyvan & Hájek, 2016, pp. 838– 839)
 11  Ralph Wedgwood (2017) relies on considerations of incommensurability to argue for the same idea: “the choice-
worthiness of options is relative to choice situations”. Temkin (2012) also addresses this idea: what he calls the 
“Essentially Comparative View.”
 12  For critiques of BT, see Bassett (2015) and Briggs (2010).
 13  For an illuminating discussion of Gandalf's principle, see Wedgwood (2013), pp. 2652– 2655.
 14  Following the formulation of Briggs (2019).
 15  In a number of decision cases where there are infinitely many states with only finite utilities attached (e.g., the St. 
Petersburg game), ECU theory inherits the advantages of Mark Colyvan's relative expectation theory over EU theory. 
More specifically, in such (infinite) decision cases, ECU theory delivers the intuitively correct verdicts, whereas EU 
theory delivers none (Colyvan, 2008; Colyvan & Hájek, 2016, pp. 838– 839).
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 16  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for giving this example.
 17  Thanks to Douglas Lackey for raising this point and for wording suggestions.
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